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FROM THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY TO THE CORPORATE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW1 
Grietje Baars 
I. Introduction 
The corporation - and especially its more complex, globally networked version, the 
multinational enterprise - is increasingly a target of intense debate. Critics report on 
‘corporate complicity’ in conflict situations, environmental disasters and degradation 
in the oil, gas and mining sectors, the privatisation of war through the use of 
mercenary-like contractors, the monopolisation of intellectual property rights over 
essential medicines, the buying up of vast swathes of agricultural land in poverty-
stricken areas of the Third World, the commodification and for-profit provision of 
various previously essential public services such as education and healthcare, and 
finally the seemingly reckless speculation on financial markets, leading to taxpayer-
funded bailouts. It is felt that corporate power is able to grow unchecked, giving rise to 
‘corporate excess’,2 that international trade rules are skewed in corporations’ favour,3 that 
bilateral investment treaties and instruments such as the putative transatlantic trade and 
investment treaty (TTIP) will provide a ‘Corporate Bill of Rights’, that ‘corporate 
accountability’ is falling short,4 and that we experience ‘governance by corporations’.5 
Indeed, it has come to the point, perhaps the point of neoliberalism’s resolution 
between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’, that we increasingly look to corporations for 
leadership in both the realm of ideas and management.6 
Although oftentimes corporations’ influence over, abuse of, or impunity from, 
international law are identified as key causes of our discomfort with corporate power, 
a deeper understanding of the precise relationship between (multinational) 
corporations and (international) law remains absent in such critiques. In this chapter I 
show how a historical reading of the concurrent development of corporations, law and 
capitalism can lead us to an alternative assessment of ‘the question of the corporation’ 
and why we might formulate different responses to this question in today’s global 
political economy. In particular, an understanding of the relationship between 
corporations, law and capitalism should enable us to reassess to what extent law is an 
adequate response to this question. 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is based on Chapter 2 of Grietje Baars, Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism: On the Impossibility of 
Restricting Business Involvement in Conflict through International Criminal Law (PhD thesis, University College 
London 2012). 
2
 Anupreeta Das ‘The media is hungry for corporate excess’ 13 March 2009, at 
http://blogs.reuters.com/mediafile/2009/03/13/the-media-is-hungry-for-corporate-excess/ 
3
 Marie Louise Malig: Tailored for Sharks: How Rules are tailored and public interest surrendered to suit can 
interests in the WTO, FTAs and BITs trade and Investment Regime, Transnational Institute and Serikat Petani 
Indonesia 2013. 
4
 Sif Thorgeirsson ‘Access to justice for victims of human rights abuses needs to be strengthened’, Corporate 
Legal Accountability Project, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre , Published on: 5 December 2014, 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/access-to-justice-for-victims-of-human-rights-abuses-needs-to-be-strengthened   
5
 The Transnational Institute/Corporate Europe Observatory: A transatlantic corporate bill of rights: Investor 
privileges in EU-US trade deal threaten public interest and democracy, June 2013. 
6
 The Telegraph, Facebook 'could have prevented Lee Rigby murder', 26 november 2014, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11253518/Facebook-could-have-prevented-Lee-
Rigby-murder.html>   
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The history of international law (IL) has long been a neglected topic.7 In 
contemporary IL, few authors discuss the ‘why’ of the emergence of law/international 
law - the development of law is often represented as a ‘self-unfolding of ideas’ or 
even a ‘teleology of freedom’.8 Often law and legal concepts appear (e.g. in judicial 
decisions or in the literature) as if out of nowhere, and yet they are presented as 
‘elementary’ and obvious. Fundamental (foundational) contradictions are thereby 
obscured (for example the idea of statehood being both antecedent to and a product of 
IL).9 International legal scholarship has moreover had a blind spot when it comes to 
the notion of the corporation/multinational enterprise10 – which should seem 
surprising considering the latter’s obvious significance in the global political 
economy and our daily lives.11 Current international law scholarship appears to view 
the corporation either as external and/or irrelevant to its field of study, or (in what is 
called ‘international economic law’ or more specifically, e.g. ‘international law of 
investment protection’12) to treat corporations (including multinationals) as self-
evident, ‘natural’, and, most importantly, inevitable facts of life.13  
The past 5-10 years, however, have seen something of a ‘turn to history’ as 
well as a ‘turn to political economy’ in critical international legal scholarship.14 The 
latter trend follows, and to some extent critically mirrors, the ‘economy and human 
rights’ trend in mainstream scholarship (for example, ‘business and human rights’, 
‘trade and human rights’, ‘development and human rights’). As part of the current 
turn to IPE, very few writers have yet touched on the corporation in international law, 
with those who have mainly doing so in the context of the history of colonialism.15 
These scholars are able to make use of a small surge of publications by historians on 
the corporation.16 The main debates in recent historical scholarship on the corporation 
occur around the question of the nature of the corporation as political, economic or 
hybrid. As such, and as pointed out by historian Pepijn Brandon, these authors 
presuppose the possibility of separation between ‘politics’ and ‘economics’. Brandon 
shows that it is in fact this ideological (illusion of) separation that has historically 
allowed space for corporate power to grow unchallenged. It is also this very 
ideological move that continues to cause a blind spot for many of today’s historians, 
legal and other scholars when it comes to the corporation. In this essay, like Brandon, 
                                                          
7 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Brill 2005) 153; cf Arthur 
Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan 1947).  
8 ibid 155. 
9 Matthew Craven, Decolonization of International Law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties (OUP 2010) 
203. 
10 Fleur Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal 
Theory’ (1995) 19 MULR 893.  In contrast, cf Nussbaum (n 7) 27-35, 203-07; Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of 
International Law (first publication 184, Michael Byers tr, de Gruyter 2000) 345-57, 546-52. 
11 The corporation is now a hot topic in various areas of scholarship, cf Andre Spicer and Grietje Baars (eds), The 
Corporation: A Critical, Interdisciplinary Handbook (CUP, forthcoming, 2015). 
12 Strictly speaking, an amalgamation of public, private and domestic law as well as soft law and business custom. 
13 Allott is an exception: Philip Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (CUP 2002) 865. 
Key works of IL theory and history do not discuss the role of the corporation in detail, e.g. Martti Koskenniemi, 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (CUP 2001). 
14 E.g. David Kennedy "Law and the Political Economy of the World," in the Leiden Journal of International Law, 
Volume 26, pp. 7-48 (2013). 
15
 Miéville (n 7) 107-8; Stephen C Neff, Friends But No Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations 
(Columbia UP 1999); James Thuo Gathii, War, Commerce and International Law (OUP 2010). 
16 Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Trade, Chartered Companies, and Mercantile Associations’, in Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 15; Philip J Stern, The 
Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (OUP 
2011); James Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-stock enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800-1870 
(Boydell & Brewer 2006). 
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I use historical materialism as a method, in the manner Orford has recently sought to 
revive in ‘In Praise of Description’.17 Historical materialist description should make 
visible that which is so close to us that we normally do not see it.  
In this chapter I focus on the ‘corporation-shaped blind spot’ in order to elucidate the 
relationship between the corporation, capitalism and international law. I examine the 
material use of law, and the corporation as a technology of law, as well as the way 
legal doctrine was constructed and used in response to specific historical-economic 
circumstances, rather than (as is usually done in histories of IL) the development of 
international law ‘in the abstract’ through the interpretation of the various 
philosophical treatises.18 The historical materialist approach shows us how 
international law was developed pragmatically in the service of global capitalism, 
rather than guided by principle – indeed, much of international law principle was 
articulated to fit desired material outcomes. It is only once we examine the 
construction of global capitalism in this dialectical manner that we get a proper grasp 
on the corporation and international law today.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In section II I describe the origin of the 
concepts of international law, states, and corporations around the same time in the 
16th and 17th Centuries. In the first half of Section III (a and b) I examine the close 
relationship between state and corporation exemplified in their concurrent 
development in history. Then in Section III c-e I show how the corporate scramble for 
Africa illustrates the instrumentalisation of corporations in colonisation, accumulation 
and the spread of capitalism in the 19th Century. In Section IV I briefly describe the 
implications this history has had for the way we view corporations in the 20th and 21st 
Centuries, before concluding in Section V. 
II. Towards capitalism, law and the corporation  
 
The first, striking discovery one makes when attempting to describe the origins of 
capitalism, law/international law, and the corporation is that their emergence occurs 
(gradually) in the same period, and is closely interlinked. The creation of trading 
corporations was profoundly implicated in the spread/export (and eventual 
universalisation) of capitalism, the state form, and the content and institutions of 
international law. I start by examining the corporate roots of IL and the early 
development of law around corporate activity in trade wars.  
a. Towards IL 
Miéville observes, “it is only through examining the changing nature of exchange and 
market relations across communities and eventually nation-states that the changing 
nature of international law can be made sense of.”19 It was from the pluralist everyday 
practice of city-states and other types of polities trading as economic units (precursors 
to the corporation) from the late Middle Ages through to the 17th C. that a ‘ius inter 
                                                          
17 Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’ (2012) 25 LJIL 609-625, 618. 
18 cf Grewe (n 10); Koskenniemi (n 13); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in 
the International Legal Order (CUP 2004). 
19 Miéville (n 7) 156. 
From the Dutch East India Company to the Corporate Bill of Rights                               
4 
 
4 
 
gentes’20 eventually developed, if generally only inhering for the duration of specific 
exchanges without becoming systematised (or universalised).21 Inter-polity law was 
developed in the struggle between polities to accumulate resources. Early examples of 
law developing around inter-polity trade were the bilateral agreements for the 
protection of merchants, both on land and sea - the latter receiving the benefit of rules 
such as those in the “Consolato del Mare” which sought to govern amongst others the 
protection rights of neutral traders in wartime.22 
Such ‘law merchant’ operated on a pragmatic basis mostly between European traders 
(and to a more limited extent, their Asian and African counterparts) until the 
‘discovery’ of America by Columbus, which profoundly changed the socio-political 
space. Faced with a ‘new world’, the Portuguese and Spanish superpowers of the time 
divided the known world between themselves in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494.23 
In the treaty a line (‘raya’) was drawn across the world between Spanish and 
Portuguese spheres of hegemony. This was not the first such line but the first global 
line. It was essentially “a feudal line between two princes”24 in a rapidly altering 
world. The question arose (predominantly in the scholarly literature of the time) how 
to view the new world, which was not part of the ‘respublica Christiana’ but also not 
classed as ‘enemy’. Once the Aztec gold was discovered this question became all the 
more salient. Spanish theologian and advisor to the Spanish King Francisco de Vitoria 
responded by denying the ‘Indians’ sovereignty (as this right was reserved for 
Christians), but advising that they did have ‘dominion’ over their territory, a 
reciprocal right of ownership.25 Of course having ownership meant having the 
hypothetical capacity to trade (in this case specifically: to sell). In De Indes Noviter 
Inventis, de Vitoria concluded that the Spanish conquest of the native kingdoms in the 
New World had been ‘legal’ because the ‘Indians’ had ‘unlawfully’ attempted to 
exclude Spanish traders (thus preventing them from ‘buying’ Aztec treasures).26 This 
is an early example of legal doctrine being developed – through the ideological claim 
that the principle of free trade was at the time in the respublica Christiana  considered 
a natural law as well as a religious right – to serve the commercial desire to acquire 
the Aztec gold.27  
When the respublica Christiana  crumbled, the ‘raya’ was replaced by ‘lines of amity’ 
which were agreed between the now up and coming French, Dutch and English 
economic powers.28 These were lines that demarcated a European sphere (where 
international law ruled) and a space beyond that European powers considered up for 
grabs.  In their competition to colonize these remaining spaces, trading companies 
became increasingly important actors.29 Eventually in the 1648 Peace of Münster 
which ended the Eighty Years War, Spain recognised the United Netherlands as 
another economic power and simultaneously recognised Dutch colonial possessions. 
                                                          
20 Grewe (n 10) 163. 
21 Miéville (n 7) 167 (contradicting himself when he states “[t]he simple fact of relations between polities is not 
enough even to claim the legal form”).  
22 Stephen C Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War (Harvard UP 2010) 8. 
23 Miéville (n 7) 171. 
24 ibid. 
25 Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et De Ivre Belli Relectiones (first publication 1532, Ernest Nys tr, Oceana 1964) 
Section III; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2007) 1-31. 
26 Vitoria (n 25); Miéville (n 7) 177. 
27 Neff (n 15) 38. 
28 Grewe (n 10) 184. 
29 Miéville (n 7) 182; Grewe (n 10) 181. 
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The lines of amity became irrelevant as European powers came to acknowledge each 
others’ ‘title’ to the various parts of the rest of the world.30 It is only at this point that 
we can properly speak of international law – even if this applied only as between 
European nations.  
b. From Merchant Adventurers, Inc. to the Joint Stock Corporation 
The transition to capitalism took place in a period of intense military conflict. The 
synergy between business interest and military conflict stimulated and shaped the 
legal transformation of the corporation from merchants’ financing and risk 
management arrangements to its modern configuration.  
 
Beginning in the second half of the 16th C, the corporate form was developed in part 
through the Chancery courts, which interpreted the rules on debt priority so as to give 
business the effects of separate personality, asset partitioning and limited liability.31 
The ‘joint-stock corporation’ (JSC) was based on financial elements of the guild 
combined with the corporate form32 (a “concrete, profit-oriented form”33), that grew 
out of the 16th Century trading enterprises used by merchant adventurers. Weber 
describes how, because of the risk of pirate attacks, single ships (each organised as a 
single venture in accounting terms) normally joined together into a ‘caravan’ and 
were either armed themselves or joined by an armed convoy.34 The proliferation of 
these types of arrangement as part of the colonial enterprise resulted in the formation 
of regulated companies, effectively extending the guild system into overseas trade.35 
These companies were awarded Royal Charters providing for incorporation and the 
grant of a trading privilege (often a trading monopoly), like the trade in a certain 
commodity and/or on a certain trade route or from a certain colony. For example, in 
1555 the Merchants Adventurers of England for the Discovery of Lands Unknown, 
also known as the ‘Muscovy or Russia Company’, were incorporated to exploit the 
sole right to travel to Russia and further north.36 The concept of ‘joint-stock’ – 
essentially the formation of companies with a more permanent form and joint 
accounting structure developed ‘by commercial necessity’ in the mid-sixteenth 
Century. Davies tracks the rapid development. From 1614 onward there was joint 
stock to which members could subscribe varying amounts for a period of years. In 
1653 a permanent joint stock was introduced, and in 1692 individual trading on 
private accounts was forbidden to members.37 Members shared profits and losses of 
all business activities of the corporation, as well as all overheads.38 From this point, 
the company traded as a single entity. 
 
The legal development of the joint-stock corporation took place within the specific 
context of a small number of merchant enterprises. “[F]rom the mid-sixteenth to the 
mid-seventeenth century, a mechanism was developed for raising money in return for 
shares, for dividing profits among shareholders, for transferring shares among 
                                                          
30 Grewe (n 10) 270; Miéville (n 7) 183. 
31 Joshua Getzler, A History of Water Rights at Common Law (OUP 2006).  
32 ibid. 
33 Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844 (CUP 2001) 
39 
34 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (first published 1905, Routledge 1992) 208. 
35 John H Farrar, Farrar’s Company Law (Butterworth 1998) 17. 
36 Baker, J.H.; An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2002) 623.  
37 Paul Davies, The Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1997) 20.  
38 Harris (n 33) 33. 
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members and to outsiders, and for keeping accounts of joint-stock concerns for long 
durations.”39 For the Crown, granting monopolies was a convenient way to facilitate 
increasing military expenditure while avoiding the parliamentary supervision attached 
to other forms of revenue such as taxation.40 In effect, “[t]he conduct of war by the 
state becomes a business operation of the possessing classes.”41 Here we see the 
synergy between governing and mercantile classes (a ‘military-mercantilist 
complex’). War loans could be very lucrative if the war was won, and in the 
meantime, the Crown could deploy the corporations as indirect means of foreign 
policy. 
 
Opening up the share market to the public caused the next momentous phase in the 
development of company law. In 1600 the British East India Company was granted a 
monopoly of the trade with the Indies by Royal Charter.42 It was the first to combine 
incorporation, overseas trade and joint stock raised from the public.43 The corporate 
form was thus developed in response to specific needs, which included raising finance 
for risky ventures, managing liability (minimizing exposure or externalizing risk), and 
administrative efficiency in aid of the larger project of the European mercantile and 
governing class finding sources for revenue in other parts of the world. 
III. Corporations, law and capitalism 
Grotius: ‘Father of international law’ and corporate counsel to the Dutch East India 
Company 
Hugo de Groot, who was later named the “father of international law”, in his younger 
years made his mark as the legal advisor to the Dutch East India Company 
(Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or “VOC” in Dutch)44  – the Dutch equivalent 
to the British East India Company in all essential aspects. Through a historically 
contextualized analysis of Grotius’ work, we can gain some insight into the role of 
corporations and trade wars in the early development of international law amidst 
mercantilist practices.  
In 1603, one of the VOC’s captains, Jan van Heemskerk, had captured a loaded 
Portuguese merchant ship, the Santa Catarina. Some of the VOC’s shareholders 
objected to the capture on religious/moral grounds. Grotius was commissioned to 
write a defence of the seizure, and did so in De Iure Praedae (On the Law of Prize).45 
In Grotius’ professional view, the capture was justified on the basis of law, honour 
and expedience. 
De Iure Praedae also contained De Mare Liberum – which introduced the idea that 
the seas are ‘global commons’, free for all states to navigate with a view to 
                                                          
39 ibid 25. 
40 ibid 41. 
41 Weber (n 34) 280. 
42 Harris (n 33) 24. 
43 Farrar (n 35) 17.  
44 Corporate counsel in the sense he was employed to write a legal brief, not ‘in permanent employ’, cf Eric 
Wilson, The Savage Republic: De Indis of Hugo Grotius, Republicanism and Dutch Hegemony within the Early 
Modern World-System (c.1600-1619), (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 7. 
45 The publication of Grotius’ De Iure Praedae was apparently pre-empted by a Dutch court order in favour of 
retaining the prize (ibid. 7). 
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exploration and plying trade.46 In Grotius’ text, waging war to break up trading 
monopolies or other interferences with trade was legally justified since, the text 
claimed, the facilitation of free trade was the overarching purpose of IL. Indeed, the 
first Dutch-Anglo war was fought over the disagreement between the idea expressed 
by Grotius’ in Mare Liberum and the idea of ‘closed seas’ described by Selden in 
Mare Clausum.47 This idea was implemented through the English Navigation Acts, a 
series of laws aimed at protecting English trading monopolies through stipulations 
that goods could only enter English harbours on board English ships.48 The fear 
among the British elite was that Mare Liberum would lead to Dutch control of the 
open seas, and closing markets or erecting significant barriers would protect the 
British economy. In the words of Walter Raleigh: “Whoever rules the waves rules 
commerce; whoever rules commerce rules the wealth of the world, and consequently 
the world itself…”49 Eventually, a compromise was agreed, and a 3-mile zone (the 
reach of protection by cannon fire, important for local security, but also for coastal 
fishing50) was to be considered “territorial waters” with the remainder open seas free 
for trade. The British and Dutch merchants themselves were naturally not particularly 
interested in the big ‘philosophical’ questions of mare liberum or mare clausum per 
se, but rather how these ideas could be operationalised to ensure the effective policing 
of their commercial interests on the high seas.51 
Grotius’ theory gained broad acceptance among legal scholars over the years, 
detached from its context, to become a standalone legal-philosophical 
representation.52 This  theory and Grotius’ larger role as the ‘father of IL’ is now 
primarily seen as ‘about war and peace’, concealing the commercial imperative 
behind his work.53 Yet when retelling the story in this way we can see how 
international law was significantly shaped to suit the interest of one particularly 
important corporation, the VOC, in relation to the idea of a just war and free trade, 
and that the international rules still in existence today regarding territorial waters 
originated as a compromise reached on the basis of the respective economic power of 
British and Dutch trading empires. 
a. Concurrent development: corporations, states and colonialism 
With the perspective Grotius’ story brings to mind, it is possible to re-cast our 
understanding of the state and corporate form. Miéville argues that for law to work 
and a legal system to come into existence (and for capitalism to mature), the creation 
of a state is not necessary. The same can be said about the corporation. However, both 
                                                          
46 Hugo Grotius, De iure prædæ commentarius. Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty. vol. I. A Translation 
of the original manuscript of 1604, by Gwladys L. Williams, with the collaboration of Walter H. Zeydel. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1950, Ch.8. 
47 Grewe (n 10) 311. 
48 Grewe (n 10) 318; Mieville (n 7) 204-6. 
49 Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global History (Routledge 1997) 47. 
50 Mathew Craven, ‘Colonialism and Domination’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 862. 
51 Grewe (n 10) 345.  
52 Wilson (n 44) 51, 128. 
53 The commercial logic of international law is also evident in Pufendorf, who described how cultura, the state of 
life produced by human industry, and commerce (which emerge to overcome humans’ natural state of imbecilitas 
and indigentia) correspond with the formation and flourishing of society; cf Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin 
Straumann, ‘The State of Nature and Commercial Sociability in Early Modern International Legal Law: 
Reflections on the Roman Foundations and Current Interpretations of the International Political and Legal Thought 
of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf,’ in Besson, S and J. Tassioulas (eds): The Philosophy of International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 33.  
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are conducive to capitalism and operate according to its logic. As the explorers 
wanted to undertake more ambitious expeditions, they sought to raise finance among 
a wider group of persons. It made sense to do so in a wider but more or less 
homogenous and increasingly centrally regulated market/locality where the traders 
could also find customers for the goods. As many directors of the trading companies 
were also active in the local and provincial administration (e.g. Dutch Republic54), the 
centralisation of administration and regulation came about as a matter of rationality. 
Perhaps then it is possible to draw a parallel here with the European state form and 
the large trading companies on the domestic level from the point of view of the elites, 
who developed both the state and corporate form as conducive to the development 
and spread of capitalism. While the physical shape of European states is a remnant of 
feudalism/pre-capitalist absolutism55 (in the sense that the national boundaries were 
drawn around the feudal estates of lords and larger provinces of lords sworn to the 
same king), the legal form of the state is conversely a construct of capitalism/the 
capitalist class.  
In the early modern period transition to capitalism, the relative novelty and plasticity 
of the state and corporate forms were employed judiciously. Miéville posits, 
“[s]overeignty is the legitimising principle by which that subject in modern 
international law - the state - faces others”56 – and indeed faces other as sovereign, 
legal equals. However, during the period of exploration and later colonialisation it 
was usually not states facing each other as sovereigns in the space ‘beyond the line’, it 
was the trading corporations that both interacted with each other and with non-
European polities. This meant that European states were able to deal indirectly with 
the non-European polities without being forced to recognise them as states. Grewe 
suggests that corporations were used in the colonisation process to prevent the state 
form from spreading beyond Europe. “The most important [effect on the development 
of international law] was the dual position taken by the trading companies: semi-
public, semi-private, which enabled the avoidance of a complete transfer of the 
European state-form, with its extensive legal consequences and its characteristics of 
sovereignty – nation, territory, borders – to the overseas colonial space,”57 he 
explains, “It was through the fact that it was the corporations and not the states 
themselves, that encountered each other, and that were considered (or at least held out 
to be) more or less independent, that a particularly elastic system of colonial 
international law was constructed.”58 Apparently, “[p]oliticians were well aware that 
the legal status of their colonial possessions was problematic. The East India 
Companies were the perfect agents to police this ‘transitional’ colonialism, because of 
their indistinct legal status.”59 This use of the corporation required the corporation to 
be viewed as something quite distinct from the state, yet equally formed as an 
extension or instrument of the state. In this way, the large trading corporations were 
the main tools in the colonisation process (not least for England and the Netherlands), 
and they represented the legal and organisational form through which the colonial 
powers annexed their conquered territories to the motherland. Likewise, the 
settlement of North America took place through the use of chartered companies. 
                                                          
54 Pepijn Brandon, ‘Marxism and the Dutch Miracle: the Dutch Republic and the transition debate’ (2011) 19 (3) 
Historical Materialism 106, 127. 
55 England and The Dutch Republic were anomalies in Europe and had representative governments. 
56 ibid. 184. 
57 Grewe (n 10) 346. 
58 Grewe (n 10) 346 (emphasis added). 
59 Miéville (n 7) 184. 
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Settlement companies such as the Virginia Company – whose aim it was, through 
private individual appropriation and settlement of land and (commonly) the 
cultivation of coffee, tea, sugar and tobacco plantations (utilising slave labour) to 
increase states’ productive land - would assert the sovereignty needed to grant land 
rights to settlers even before such authority over the territory could be said to have 
arisen. This curious inversion60 is another example of law’s pragmatic ‘invention’ in 
the service of capitalism. The legal-economic form of the corporation allowed the 
assertion of political power, not simply vice versa. As a very ‘direct’ example of this, 
through the Plymouth Company, the Puritans of the ‘Mayflower’ hoped to gain the 
political freedom and independence in New England which they had been denied in 
Europe.61 
In certain situations, corporations thus mirrored or wore the mask of ‘state 
sovereignty’, which sometimes extended well beyond the power to grant land rights. 
Wilson uses the term “Corporate Sovereignty” to describe the nature of the VOC’s 
operations in the 17th C.62 The main French, English and Dutch colonial companies 
were endowed with delegated sovereign rights by way of their Charters. Among these 
was, for example, the grant by Charles II to the British East India Company in 1661 
with the express right to send war ships, personnel, and armoury for the defence of the 
Company’s factories and trading posts and to decide over war and peace with all non-
Christian peoples. In 1677 the right to coinage was added. Dutch and French 
companies similarly delegated sovereign powers, such as the right to wage wars of 
trade and territory with other European entities. At the same time, ideological 
separateness allowed such wars to take place ‘beyond the line’ and thus not to affect 
the internal European peace.63  
There are direct parallels to be drawn here between other contemporary instances of 
protection of trade in times of conflict.64 “Business” and “politics” are each assigned a 
separate conceptual realm despite their obvious entanglement. “The close relation 
between a state-authorised monopoly and the state itself … meant that the boundaries 
between the company and the state were permeable, and the monopoly trade could be 
used to underpin political (state) control. The monopoly nature of these companies 
was the means by which their parent state retained control over its colonial 
possessions in an era of increasingly bounded sovereignty.”65 The strength of the 
nascent capitalist ‘military-industrial complex’ lies in the capitalist class’ ability to 
split and reunite at will, its interests appearing sometimes political (or public) and at 
other times commercial (or private). It is law that enables this conjecture.66 
The interests of the European traders, settlers and investors (which included, of 
course, European statesmen) were protected further by the way they managed to 
uphold the idea that their national laws travelled with them wherever they went 
overseas. They managed generally to enforce the application of ‘Imperial law’ in the 
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colonies and extraterritorial application of imperial law in the trading enclaves (e.g. in 
China, Japan), with disputes being referred to the imperial courts. The implication of 
this was that local rulers could not expropriate traders’ property or pass laws that 
negatively affected the foreign merchants’ operations. As I will show below (S. IV), 
this state of affairs is effectively still current. 
b. The 19th C. Trade Corporations preparing the ground for states in the Western 
image 
While the company and crown/state interests had coincided effectively as class 
interest in the mercantilist period, the increasing ideological public/private and 
political/economic division brought also about real competition between merchants 
and statesmen. The old colonial companies’ monopolies were slowly reconciled to the 
idea of free trade. The old trading companies of the first colonisation period (16th-18th 
C.) continued to exist into the 19th C. but their independence, power and significance 
had long dissipated. The British Crown, for instance, took over direct control of India 
from the British East India Co. by means of the 1773 Regulating Act. “[M]onopoly 
companies had outlived their usefulness as agents of colonialism,” explains Miéville, 
“India was simply too profitable to be left in the control of a company which was 
structured to treat it as a treasure-chest. By taking it over politically the British state 
helped institutionalise the separation of politics and economics associated with mature 
capitalism.”67 The outcome, however, was that though “[o]stensibly aimed at 
checking the oppression of the Company’s rule the real effect of the Act was to 
systematise the exploitation of India”.68 Another effect of the Regulating Act – which 
it exempted the financially ailing East India Company’s tea from import duties - was 
rather momentous too. When this favourable treatment was discovered by rival 
American traders, Company tea was thrown into the Boston Harbour. The ‘Boston 
Tea Party’ became one of the major acts of revolt leading to the American 
Revolution. 
When European states in the 19th C. did want to create new (although dependent) 
states to take over the colonised areas or settle new ones, they used a mostly new set 
of corporations to ensure those states took exactly the shape that they wanted (and 
presumably also, had exactly the leaders they wanted).69 According to Koskenniemi: 
“[t]he end of informal empire meant that European public institutions – in particular, 
European sovereignty – needed to be projected into colonial territory”.70 Britain 
intensified what Koskenniemi calls ‘informal’ influence through the proliferation of a 
new type of chartered company, and “[b]y the time the scramble [for Africa] was 
over, more than 75 percent of British acquisitions south of the Sahara were acquired 
by chartered companies.”71 Many of these companies sought alliances with local 
leaders, but often proved to be ineffective at administering territory. When these 
territories needed to be recognised as sovereign in their own right, however, the form 
(including institutional form and law) and content of that sovereignty had already 
been constructed. 
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c. The Corporate Scramble for Africa 
The corporate scramble for Africa had as its main aim the creation of markets, and the 
establishment of those institutional conditions necessary for these markets to function 
and be integrated into global capitalism. This logic included a reinterpretation of 
slavery to not only function as the creation of free labour but to constitute a generative 
condition for the market economy.72 The scramble marked the start of a new phase of 
instrumentalisation of the corporate form in colonialism – the third category of mutual 
implication of international law, global capitalism and the corporation identified 
above. This instrumentalisation occurred behind an outwardly clearer separation (and, 
‘deniability’) between the state sphere and a vast network of private companies given 
wide rein to run the colonies. For example, in 1881 the British North Borneo 
Company was founded, in 1886 the Royal Niger Company, in 1888 the Imperial 
British East Africa Company, and in 1889 the British South Africa Company.73 The 
latter was run by Cecil Rhodes, under a charter giving him practically a free hand to 
administer the area (his ‘irresponsible policy’ is said to have ‘almost inevitably’ led to 
the Boer War).74 
Similarly, what was to become German South West Africa was acquired in 1882 by a 
tobacco merchant from Bremen, with the Zanzibar region being administered by the 
German East Africa Company and the Imperial British East Africa Company.75 Vast 
tracts of land were granted by the German government to the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschaft, which proceeded with a policy of settler colonialism, granting 
many German farmers and entrepreneurs generous concessions.76 German companies 
active on the ground included a railway company, the company running the ports, 
Deutsche Bank and various mining companies. New German settlers began to 
question whether the colony might not be better off without the ‘black problem’, or, 
the presence of an indigenous people, the Herero. One colonial leader is quoted as 
saying, “I do not concur with those…who want to see the Herero destroyed 
altogether. Apart from the fact that a people of 60,000 or 70,000 is not so easy to 
annihilate, I would consider such a move a grave mistake from an economic point of 
view. We need the Herero as cattle breeders …and especially as labourers. It will be 
quite sufficient if they are politically dead.”77 This plea was apparently rejected by the 
companies and Imperial Germany,78 which sent in General von Trotha, who had just 
suppressed the Arab rebellion in German East Africa, and who responded “I shall 
annihilate the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of gold.”79 After the 
brutal crushing of the Herero uprising by the German army, German military rule 
returned. The around 15,000 surviving Herero were placed in concentration camps 
maintained by (amongst others) the Woermann shipping company, where they were 
                                                          
72 Craven (n 50). 
73 Grewe (n 10) 548. 
74 ibid 120. 
75 ibid 118-120.  
76 Hereros v Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co, 06 F3d 1684 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Hereros Complaint). The ‘Herero 
genocide’ became the subject of compensation litigation in the US in 2001, available here: 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/US/Herero_Genocide_Case_Complaint_06-09-
2001.pdf . – NOTE: TO COPY EDITOR, PLEASE SEE HOW TO CITE CORRECTLY  
77 Hereros Complaint (n 76) para 92. 
78 The Hereros Complaint (n 76)  denotes the Deutsche Bank, the Terex Corporation (then Orenstein-Koppel 
which built railways and ran mines) and the Woermann Line shipping and ports company together as the “German 
Colonial Enterprise”. 
79 Hereros Complaint (n 76) 95. 
From the Dutch East India Company to the Corporate Bill of Rights                               
12 
 
12 
 
subjected to slave labour, rape and medical experimentation.80 Almost half those put 
to work building railways died. This example highlights the ‘deniability’ factor of 
arms-length outsourcing of the colonial enterprise.81 
In 1881 Portugal founded the Mozambique-company. In 1900, French Equatorial 
Africa was divided up between forty French concession companies. These new 
companies were a ‘different beast’ altogether from the old trading companies, as they 
did not have the right to wage war, nor a trading monopoly, and were placed under 
strict state control.82 Ahead of the Berlin Conference in 1884, German Chancellor 
Bismarck (who had inaugurated Germany’s colonial policy, actively promoting 
German colonial enterprise so as to find new markets for developing German 
industry83) expressed the demarcations of this manner of ‘corporate sovereignty’ as 
follows:  
‘My intention, as approved by the Emperor, is to leave the responsibility for 
the material development of a colony as well as its inauguration to the action 
and enterprise of our seafaring and trading citizens, and to proceed less on the 
system of annexing the transoceanic provinces to the German Empire than that 
of granting charters, after the form of the English Royal Charters, encouraged 
by the glorious career which the English merchants experienced in the 
foundation of the East India Company; also to leave to the persons interested 
in the colony the government of the same, only granting them European 
jurisdiction for Europeans and so much protection as we may be able to afford 
without maintaining garrisons. I think, too, that a colony of this kind should 
possess a representative of the Imperial Authority with the title of Consul or 
Resident, whose duty it would be to receive complaints, while the disputes 
which might arise out of these commercial enterprises would be decided by 
one of our Maritime or Mercantile Courts at Bremen, Hamburg, or somewhere 
else. It is not our intention to found provinces but commercial undertakings.’84 
Bismarck here describes a manner of ‘outsourcing’ avant la lettre of the colonial 
enterprise. The new arrangement seemed designed to reap all possible benefits, while 
any commercial risk the company took remained with the company.85 This flexible 
approach allowed the state to use the company when it suited state interests, and to 
distance itself when it did not. The late 19th C trading company concept influenced 
European and colonial forms of governance and was influenced by non-private 
dynamics. “[T]he colonial territory was now fundamentally divided up, organised and 
governed according to the principles and concepts of the inter-state law that was 
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developed in Europe.”86 At the same time, one of the main means of spreading 
capitalism and creating states in the image of the modern European state, was the 
replacement of local laws with the laws and legal concepts of the colonial state and 
institutions under the tutelage of the imperial institutions. For example, Hopkins 
describes how notions of collective ownership of property prevalent in the colonies 
were replaced by European notions of private property because “to establish a 
virtuous circle of development it was necessary to export commercial institutions and 
approved property rights”87 Conversely, Craven describes the 1918 decision of the 
Privy Council, In re Southern Rhodesia , where it was held that the British South 
African Company had the right to alienate certain land in Southern Rhodesia - the 
“absence of indigenous knowledge of the institution of private property … effectively 
allowed the extinguishment of all native title through the fact of settlement.”88  
Another way for a company to gain entry to a ‘colony’ was to buy up or refinance a 
government’s sovereign debt. This is how the Firestone company gained a 99 year 
lease over 1 million acres of Liberian land, which it transformed into a rubber 
plantation, removing villagers off their land and recruiting them as workers at 
gunpoint.89 By 1929, some 350,000 Liberians were reportedly forced into 
employment by Firestone in circumstances comparable to those in Leopold’s Congo. 
Liberia was not a colony in the technical sense, but since its founding by the 
American Colonization Society in 1847, it was indebted to the company as its sole 
creditor.90 This could be presented as a good thing: the former Liberian president 
noting that since Firestone had taken control of Liberia, border disputes promptly 
ceased.91 Colonial styled corporations were not simply expressions of foreign 
imposition, their formats allowed them to be instrumentalised by host state elites 
under the rationalities of order and self-determination. 
d. The Congo Corporation and the State Form 
The story of the Congo shows in one example how companies became vehicles for 
the transfer of the European state form. In 1876 the Association Internationale 
Africaine (AIA) was founded at the behest of the Belgian King Leopold II, apparently 
motivated by private gain and political intrigue.92 In 1878 the International Congo 
Society was founded (also chaired by Kind Leopold), which formed the profit-seeking 
front for the more ‘philanthropic’ AIA. The 1884 Berlin West Africa Conference 
recognised the society as sovereign over what became known as the Congo Free State 
and as a member of the international community by the major powers present at 
Berlin.93 Renton, Seddon and Zeilig describe the rule of Leopold in The Congo within 
the broader context of turn-of-the 19th century colonial Africa. King Leopold’s 
company took control of the rubber and ivory trades, while giving much of the land of 
the Congo to concessionary businesses who would build infrastructure and control the 
territory. These companies were granted the right to levy taxes, which meant the 
                                                          
86 ibid 552. 
87 Hopkins, A. G.: Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain’s Annexation of Lagos, 1861, The Journal of 
Economic History 40(4) (1980) 777-798. 
88 cf Craven (n 8) 50; In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] A.C. 211. 
89  John Roe I et al v Bridgestone Corporation et al. (Firestone Complaint) 7 November 2005, available at 
http://iradvocates.org/sites/default/files/11.17.05%20Complaint.pdf  
90 ibid 38. 
91 ibid 38. 
92 Grewe (n 10) 551. 
93 David Renton, David Seddon and Leo Zeilig, The Congo: Plunder and Resistance (Zed Books 2006) 24.  
From the Dutch East India Company to the Corporate Bill of Rights                               
14 
 
14 
 
previously self-sufficient non-monetary economy had to develop to produce surplus 
and the population had to offer itself up as wage labour. New companies were also 
founded to exploit the mineral wealth, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (1905) 
amongst many others, mostly owned directly or indirectly by King Leopold. A large 
bureaucracy was set up and run by around 1500 European civil servants. One of the 
Congo’s richest resources proved to be rubber, called ‘red rubber’ after the brutal 
regime in which it was harvested. King Leopold’s corporate rule created a ‘slave 
society’, and more generally, “[u]nder direct European or American rule, forced 
labour became widespread throughout the continent, and an ‘economy of pillage’ 
became the norm.”94 We can see here the direct correspondence between the process 
of the forcible creation of a wage-labour force and the expropriation of land (and 
other natural resources) in the Congo (and indeed the rest of the African continent) 
and ‘primitive accumulation’ in Britain. Moreover, direct correspondence can be seen 
between the Congolese (and Rhodesian and Liberian) examples and the corporate 
imperialism of the 20th C – what David Harvey describes as ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. Renton and Zeilig point out that the Congolese population declined 
sharply (from around 20 million in 1891 to 8.5 million in 1911) as a result of disease, 
massacre and the result of forced labour. The main ‘winners’, as they see it, were 
King Leopold, the shareholders of his companies, and the various banks involved in 
financing the enterprise.95  
King Leopold was able to successfully hold onto his possession partly because he 
‘presented himself as the inheritor of the liberal ideal’. However, “[b]eneath the high-
flowing rhetoric, financial calculations were evidently being made.”96 The end of the 
corporate Congo was brought about by three factors: first, resistance and rebellions in 
the Congo itself;97 second, a reform movement in Europe and the U.S.; and third, 
commercial interests by rivals – all in addition to the classic European rivalries with 
the ultimately unsuccessful British government effort to end Leopold’s regime on the 
basis that the Congo was a ‘British discovery’.98 In contrast, the reform effort proved 
a more effective check on Leopold. Missionary reports of the extraordinary cruelty of 
Leopold’s regime helped spark a popular campaign to urge Belgium to take the 
Congo into government control or to allow it to be independent (or even to transfer it 
to British rule). The campaign included Booker T. Washington, Mark Twain, Arthur 
Conan Doyle and Joseph Conrad as well as others. In addition, world powers began to 
realise the significant mineral wealth in the Congo. This included the US which 
would later use Congolese uranium to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.99 In 1908 
Belgium ‘nationalised’ the King’s private corporate empire, and in 1913 opened it up 
to ‘free trade’. The British-Belgian company Union Minière stayed, recruiting (often 
at gunpoint) workers for its copper mines from the whole surrounding region (what is 
now Rwanda, Zambia, and Uganda).100 The Congo example shows deniability of the 
state-corporate link – the Congo company state was portrayed as King Leopold’s 
private adventure or folly. At the same time, it (and the corporate scramble for Africa 
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more generally) did create the conditions for and realization of capitalism in areas 
previously relatively untouched by Europe’s ‘capitalising mission’. 
e. The Berlin Conference: Legalising corporate imperialism 
The Berlin West African Conference has broader significance than simply in relation 
to the Congo. In their rivalries, European states began to fear for the validity of their 
agreements with non-European powers, since the titles to their territories were 
concluded with colonized people otherwise considered ‘uncivilized’ and without legal 
agency. The Europeans managed to safeguard their interests and make these ‘unequal 
treaties’ part of general IL by giving them a literal, positivist reading and endorsing 
them as valid (ignoring whether they had been made under duress or deceit).101 
Anghie notes the fact that most colonial territories were acquired by force combined 
by formal ‘legal’ acts of local chiefs signing over “all our country…all sovereign 
rights…and all and every other claim absolutely, and without any reservation, to Her 
Most Gracious Majesty… and heirs and successors, for all time coming”.102 What is 
witnessed here is the concrete example of how primitive accumulation may be 
legalised and how an ‘agreement’ forming feudal proto-law is turned into what we 
now consider ‘law’. The particular challenge in the context of the Berlin Conference 
(where “humanitarianism and profit-seeking were presented in proper and judicious 
balance”103) was that the interests at hand had to locate the non-European world in the 
international law framework somehow. To do so, the conference participants passed 
the Berlin Act which regulated freedom of navigation and trade, as well as the rules 
on the acquisition of new territory.104 Its most infamous provision, Art. 35, obliged 
parties to establish authority in the African territories “insofar as necessary to ensure 
free trade”.105 At the same time, protectorates were excluded from this obligation, 
which “allowed the British, for instance, to uphold their unlimited commercial empire 
while at the same time avoiding the financial and administrative burdens … [of] 
formal occupation.”106 Thus, the Berlin Act systematized and legalised the scramble 
for Africa, and at the same time, extended the rhetoric of the civilising mission to 
cover (up) the economic motivations of colonisation: “[n]ow, because trade was the 
mechanism for advancement and progress, it was essential that trade be extended as 
far as possible into the interior of all these societies.”107 The ‘capitalising mission’ 
was thus re-branded as the ‘civilising mission’, paving the way for further corporate 
exploitation in the 20th and 21st centuries.  
IV. Corporations in IL in the 20th and 21st centuries  
 
Into the 20th C., corporations continued to be used for political ends (e.g., the ‘banana 
wars’ in Central and South America108) and state governing elites continued to act as 
private property owners within institutional configurations that were at once formally 
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equal and materially unequal. While IL was to continue to facilitate both, it now 
became more urgent to construct some semblance of separation between the economic 
and political realms in IL, which in the early 20th C started to gain specifically liberal 
humanitarian content. By creating an ideological divide separating ‘clearly’ economic 
activities by private actors from political/public/state activities, it became acceptable 
to shield the former from ‘interference’ by the latter, or in other words, to let the 
former be ruled by the market, and the latter (ostensibly) by liberal humanitarian 
concerns. The conceptualisation of free trade as a value in itself – a remnant from the 
Grotius era - renders this separation legitimate. 
The discourse of ‘positivism’ that had become dominant by the early 20th C with its 
notion of international law as a system of rules between consenting states also served 
to conceal the role of class and the corporation in international law.109 Despite earlier 
notions of ‘corporate sovereignty’ and effective corporate legal personality in IL, the 
20th C notion of corporate personality became circumscribed and contested. As 
corporations are non-subjects, business people are able to wield the collective power 
of the corporation and construct normative regimes ‘below the radar’ of public IL. 
One particularly ‘lucrative’ area in this sense,  the regime of investment protection, is 
entirely aimed at serving their specific interest while not formally affecting ‘public’ 
law notions of statehood and sovereignty.110 The effect of positivism and the 
public/private divide is that it constructs a sphere of liberty where the global capitalist 
class can pursue (overseas) economic interests with little oversight. The discourse of 
‘responsibility’ is situated in the ‘constitutional’/’political’ part of international law 
and ‘corporate activity’ enclosed in the ‘private’ domain of international law111 
resulting in a significant ideological hurdle that must be overcome before one might 
be associated with the other.  
Before the corporate colonialism of the 19th C. could move to global liberal capitalist 
statehood of the 20th C., the ground for ‘self-determination’ and ‘decolonisation’ had 
to be prepared so as not to affect Western corporate interests in the Third World. The 
European capitalist class had to publicly divest itself of political responsibility for the 
periphery while retaining its private material hold. The technique, following the late 
19th C. informal empire companies, was the granting of concession agreements with 
wide powers and long terms – some being concluded in the context of mandates and 
trusteeships, others directly. Moreover, the physical shape of future states was made 
subject to these interests. For example, “France and Great Britain were intent on 
gaining control over the oil resources in their Middle Eastern mandates and they went 
so far as to redraw the boundaries of the mandate territories of Palestine, 
Mesopotamia and Syria in order to enable a more efficient exploitation of their oil 
reserves.”112 This is a striking example of the form of law affecting material reality – 
all around the shape of corporate activity. 
The newly decolonised states are ‘unequal sovereigns’113 in the sense that their 
sovereignty is recognised by the metropole/global capitalist class conditional upon 
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(amongst others) continued free access to markets and natural resources. As such, the 
opportunity to gain statehood presents the ‘equal opportunity to be unequal’. The 
various rhetorical processes (the public/private divide, the definition of key concepts 
in IL such as sovereignty and personality) are employed to support, strengthen and 
conceal global class relationships. The ‘international law of investment protection’ 
was developed to safeguard corporate interests (granted in concession agreements in 
the decolonisation process and after moments of political change and conflict) in the 
Third World outside of the decolonisation process and continues to prioritise 
multinational enterprises’ interests over others’ today.   
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have given some examples to show how the global capitalist class, 
including members of governing and business elites, have employed, and still do 
employ law for a capitalising mission to create the global market society we find 
ourselves within today.  Within this process, the corporate form is one of its main 
technologies. As Pashukanis surmised, “international law owes its existence to the 
fact that the bourgeoisie exercises its domination over the proletariat and over 
colonial countries.”114 His commodity form theory of law, recently revived and 
elaborated by China Miéville, is helpful in analysing the relationship between law, 
capital and the corporation. Crucially, this theory provides us with an understanding 
and theorisation of law’s form (the ‘lawness’ of law) while also offering guidance as 
to the development of law’s content.  
Miéville summarises the “commodity-form theory of law” as follows: “Law is a 
relation between subjects abstracted of social context, facing each other in a 
relationship predicated on private property, dependent on coercion.”115 Coercion and 
violence are inherent in the legal form as the notion of “mine” necessary to ownership 
and commodity exchange is only meaningful inasmuch as it is “mine-not-yours”.116 In 
the transition from feudal relations of production, this Capitalist law was 
“universalised”,117 which generally coincided with the advent of European 
parliamentary democracy (through which the bourgeoisie eventually gained political 
as well as economic control). The bourgeois state is described by Marxists as a 
“committee for managing the affairs of the middle class”118 and an “ideological 
smokescreen to conceal [ruling class] hegemony”.119 
According to Miéville, the guarantee between formally “equal states” in the absence 
of a superior authority rests in the balance of forces.120 Eventually, as Miéville 
surmises by quoting Marx, “between equal rights, force decides.”121 The ‘force’ Marx 
means is not necessarily physical violence (war) as Miéville seems to suggest, but the 
‘force’ of domination and exploitation through ownership of the means of production 
- the ultimate unfreedom of labour. The capitalist class still has at its disposal the 
feudal ‘power’ to coerce, but it is the achievement of capitalism that this is no longer 
(or rarely) necessary. The capitalist class coerces by virtue of its ownership of the 
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means of production, while the modern capitalist Rechtsstaat coerces through law 
backed up by the legitimate threat, or use, of physical and economic force. 
Ultimately, therefore, the real regulating factor in the world is the economic 
imperialism of the global capitalist class, which is first and foremost implemented 
using the corporate form. Law, law’s institutions and law’s bureaucracy, have to some 
extent been developed (mostly by lawyers) to have their own internal logic 
(coherence, rhetoric),122 but this logic follows the logic of economic imperialism and 
is based on the commodity form. Still, modern day economic imperialism is 
administered primarily through the construct of the corporation, through its 
international ‘management committees’, the World Trade Organisation and the 
Bretton Woods institutions, arbitral tribunals, and legal tools such as bilateral and 
regional investment treaties, loans and debt restructuring agreements, and so forth – 
and all at the behest of the capital owning classes.123  
Understanding the intimate, symbiotic relationship between (international) law, 
(global) capital and the (multinational) corporation, therefore, should give us pause to 
think about where precisely to locate the response to ‘the question of the corporation’. 
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123 cf Akbar Rasulov, ‘The life and times of the modern law of reservations: the doctrinal genealogy of general 
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